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i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case. This matter results from the failure of the District Court to 
suppress the test results of a blood draw. 
II 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, the Honorable Richard G. Bevan, District 
Judge, presided over Coats' Motion to Suppress statements Coats made subsequent to arrest and 
the results of a warrantless blood draw also subsequent to arrest. The Court entered its 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Suppress on May 13, 2016, suppressing certain 
statements made by Coats, but failing to suppress the alcohol concentration results obtained from 
the warrantless blood draw. Subsequent to making his ruling, Judge Bevan disqualified himself 
from further proceedings. Coats entered a plea of guilty to Felony DUI, retaining his right to 
appeal before The Honorable Randy, J. Stoker who presided over sentencing. Coats appeals the 
decision of Judge Bevan wherein he failed to suppress the test results of the blood draw. 
III 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Travis Coats was arrested for Driving Under the Influence on the 25th day of January, 
2015. The vehicle Coats was driving rear ended another motorist who was stopped at a stop 
light. Officer Messenger and Officer Kelly of the Twin Falls Police Department arrived at the 
scene and started an investigation. Coats remained in his vehicle. Kelly discerned that Coats' 
speech was slurred, that he had little to no balance and appeared to be heavily under the 
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influence. Coats had difficulty writing. Coats was unable to complete field sobriety testing. He 
was arrested and taken into custody. Coats "blew" a 0.0, and 0.0 on the offered breath testing 
implement. Believing that Coats was "on something", Officer Kelly discussed bringing in a 
Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) to assess Coats for the purpose of obtaining a search warrant. 
No DRE's were available. As a result, Officer Kelly sought to obtain Coats' consent for the 
purpose of obtaining a blood draw for analysis for concentration of drugs. 
Officer Kelly advised Coats of his Miranda Rights. Coats invoked his right against self-
incrimination, twice saying "no" to two similar questions which asked Coats if he wanted to talk 
to Officer Kelly. Despite the invocation of rights, Officer Kelly continued his interrogation for 
the purpose of obtaining Coats' consent for the blood draw. Despite being told that Coats did 
not want to talk to him, Officer Kelly persisted and asked Coats if he would submit to a blood 
draw. Coats replied, "Is that necessary?". Officer Kelly did not respond "no", but rather pursued 
a line of questioning that was for the purpose of getting Coats to disclose what he had taken. 
Eventually, Coats replied that he had taken Soma and that he did not have a prescription 
therefore. The interrogation then shifted slightly as the focus of the questions was to determine 
how much was in Coats' system. Eventually Coats conceded to have his blood drawn. He was 
transported to the hospital, where his consent for the draw was obtained by hospital staff. 
The audio recording of the interrogation by Officer Kelly provides the following relevant 
and important portions of the disc, beginning at 49:50: 
49:50 Officer comes in room 
Coats: "Now what?" 
Kelly: "I am waiting to hear back to see if we have a Drug 
Recognition Expert that can come out here and take a look at you. Okay? 
Cause I am going to be honest with you, your physical abilities are not 
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normal okay? You are showing indicators that you have been consuming 
some type of drug that is interfering with your ability to function 
normally, okay? You can't stand. You have zero balance whatsoever. A 
few other things on top of that you know that is why we have indications 
that you've, you consumed something-that is impairing your ability to 
drive." 
Conversation with another officer re calling State police for a DRE 
51:05 
Kelly: "I am going to advise you of your Miranda rights and ask 
you a couple of questions." 
Miranda read 
Kelly: "Do you understand those rights as I have explained them to 
you? Okay, with those rights in mind do you want to talk with me today?-
with those rights in mind do you want to talk with me about what you 
have been doing today?" (51 :25) 
me?" 
Coats: "No" 
Kelly: "You don't want to talk with me?" 
Coats: "Is that bad?" 
Kelly: "No, no I'm just clarifying that you don't want to talk to 
51 :36 Coats: "No I've been fine" 
51 :48 Kelly: Would you be willing to let the hospital draw blood 
so that we can do a blood test to see what is in your system?" 
Coats: "Is that necessary?" 
Kelly: "I think you are on something. Okay. I think you have 
taken something obviously that is impairing your ability to function." 
Coats: "Yea" 
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Kelly: "and you were driving and you got in an accident. A bad 
accident. I mean you did a lot of damage. You were lucky that none of the 
kids in that car were actually injured." 
Coats: "Exactly" 
Kelly: "okay, so I want to know what caused that because I think 
there is something in your system that is causing you to act the way you 
are. I just want to know what that is. There are two ways I can find out 
(52:40) you can tell me ... . 
Coats: "I didn't ... I don't drink" 
Kelly: "We've ruled out alcohol-It wasn't alcohol. I have ruled 
that out. (52:43) I am wondering what it was though. Because you told me 
you don't have any medical issues you are not a diabetic but you can't 
stand up for longer than 3 seconds without almost falling over." (53:06) 
man." 
Discussion about trying to put socks on, falling over etc. 




Kelly: "Do you have a prescription for Soma?" 
Coats: "No" 
Kelly: "You don't? Have much Soma have you taken today?" 
Coats: "What's that?" 
Kelly: "How much Soma did you take today"? 
Coats: "Four" 
Kelly: "Four Soma's today? (53:37) 
Coats: "Yea" 
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Discussion re where soma came from. 
Kelly: "If we go over to the hospital and ask her to draw your 
blood-would you be willing to allow her to draw your blood so I can test it 
for and see exactly how much Soma you have in your system?" 
Coats: "Yea" 
Kelly: "You would? Okay" 
Coats: "That would help me out?" 
Kelly: "It would help the situation out for figuring out exactly 
what it is. I can't say it would necessarily help you or help me it's just 
the course of action that we want to do, okay" (54:36) 
CD/Audio-Defendant's Exhibit A, Officer Kelly/Messenger Audio, Track III 
IV 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT HA VE SUPPRESSED THE TEST 
RESULTS OF THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW OF COATS? 
a. DID COATS REVOKE HIS IMPLIED CONSENT BY SAYING NO, 
TWICE, INDICATING THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO TALK WITH 
OFFICER KELLY? 
b. DID COATS OBJECT TO THE BLOOD DRAW BY SA YING NO, TWICE, 
INDICATING THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO TALK WITH OFFICER 
KELLY? 
c. DID OFFICER KELLY'S CONTINUED INTERROGATION NOT ONLY 
VIOLATE COATS' FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS BUT HIS FOURTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AS WELL? 
d. DID OFFICER KELL Y'S CONTINUED INTERROGATION AMOUNT TO 
POLICE MISCONDUCT? 
e. IF SO, WAS THE POLICE MISCONDUCT SUCH THAT THE TEST 
RESULTS OF THE BLOOD DRAW SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. The Appellate Court 
"accepts the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Wulff, 157 Idaho at 
418, 337 P.3d at 577. However, this court freely reviews the trial court's application of 
constitutional principles in light of those facts." State v. Eversole, 160 Idaho 239, 371 P.3d 293 
(2016). 
ARGUMENT 
Here, the District Court found that there had been a violation of Miranda, when the 
arresting officer continued questioning after Coats invoked the privilege. R, p. 199. As a 
result, all subsequent statements were suppressed. R, p. 200. However, the court denied Coats' 
request to suppress the blood draw requests. R, pp. 208,209. The District court held Coats had 
consented to the blood draw which precluded suppression. Also, that Coats "gave both implied 
and direct consent". R, p.202. 
Before custodial interrogation can commence, an accused shall be informed of the right 
to remain silent and the right to counsel to the accused's Fifth Amendment rights. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966). The right to remain silent, 
protecting ones constitutional right against self-incrimination is scrupulously followed in Idaho. 
See for example State v. Robinson, 115 Idaho 800, 770 P.2d 809 (Ct.App 1989); State v. 
Harmon, 131 Idaho 80 (Idaho App. 1998), 952 P .2d 402 (Ct.App 1982). The privilege protects 
the accused from giving testimony against himself, or to not provide evidence of a "testimonial 
or communicative nature." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct.1826, 1830, 16 
L.Ed. 2d 908 (1966). See also, Harmon, Supra. Schmerber held that since a state-compelled 
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blood test to determine alcohol concentration was physical evidence not testimony, or 
communicative, the privilege does not apply. 
The District Court cited Robinson, Supra and Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), 
and State v. Moulds, 105 Idaho 880, 673 P.2d 1074 (Ct.App. 1983) noting that once the right is 
invoked, the police must honor the request. The court then determined that Coats had invoked, 
twice, and suppressed any statements made after invoking. R, p. 200. Where an officer 
inquires whether a suspect will submit to blood-alcohol test, such has been deemed not to be an 
interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 
916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures." Harmon, 
Supra at 85 and 407. Requiring a person to submit to a blood draw for evidentiary testing is a 
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); State v. 
Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418, 337 P.3d 575, 577 (2014). Warrantless searches or seizures are 
presumed to be unreasonable, therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.E2d 564 (1991); State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 
288, 900 P.2d 196 (1995); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct 1552 (2013). Consent is an exception 
to the Warrant requirement. State v. Whitely, 124 Idaho 261, 858 P.2d 800 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Two recent Idaho cases support the legal principles cited above: State v. Eversole, 160 
Idaho 239, 371 P.3d 293 (2016) and State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 371 P.3d 316 (2016). In 
Eversole, the court cited Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), determining, that prior 
Idaho precedent that implied consent could not be revoked was inconsistent with McNeely and, 
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therefore, implied consent can be revoked. In fact the court in Eversole stated "a defendant's 
refusal, protest, or objection to alcohol concentration testing terminates the implied consent 
given under Idaho's implied consent statue: 
[A]n implied consent statute such as ... Idaho's does not justify a warrantless 
blood draw from a driver who refuses to consent ... or objects to the blood 
draw ... .Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person to 
withdraw that consent. 
State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643,646, 339 P.3d 368,371 (2014). See also State v. Arrotta, 157 
Idaho 773, 774, 339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014) ("A suspect can withdraw his or her statutorily 
implied consent to a test for the presence of alcohol."). 
"Where the issue is whether consent was obtained, the State has the burden of proof that 
such consent was freely and voluntarily given." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
The Eversole court held: 
In this case, Eversole refused to participate in an evidentiary test for 
alcohol concentration. He thereby withdrew any implied consent created 
by Idaho Code section 18-8002(1 ), which includes breath, blood, or urine 
testing. After Eversole refused the breath test, the police officer took him 
to a hospital where a blood sample was drawn for alcohol testing. 
Because Eversole's implied consent to evidentiary testing for alcohol 
concentration already had been revoked, the consent exception to the 
warrant requirement was inapplicable, unless the State proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence some subsequent action or statement 
Eversole made within a reasonable time renewing his consent to 
evidentiary testing. The State did not do so. Therefore the blood was an 
impermissible warrantless search, and the test results must be 
suppressed. 
State v. Eversole, 160 Idaho 239, 371 P.3d 298 (2016). 
Rios was decided shortly after Eversole. Rios, likewise is consistent with the principles 
enunciated above. " ... implied consent may justify a warrantless blood draw only when (1) the 
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driver gave his or her initial consent by voluntarily driving on Idaho roads, and (2) the driver did 
not revoke consent before the time of evidentiary testing." State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 3 71 
P.3d 320. 
Verbally objecting to a blood draw withdraws consent. State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 
339 P.3d 368 (2014). Eversole held that a driver who refused to submit to breath testing 
withdrew implied consent to all BAC testing. Eversole, 160 Idaho 239, 371 P.3d at 298. A 
refusal to consent is a withdrawal of consent Halseth, 157 Idaho at 646,339 P.3d at 371. Both 
Eversole and Rios indicate that a refusal, protest, or objection to alcohol concentration testing 
terminates implied consent. Where Rios refused to sign the form, he had withdrawn his implied 
consent. The Rios court also noted, "where there is no evidence that Rios renewed his consent to 
the blood draw after declining to sign the consent form," was not evidence of voluntarily 
reinitiating conversations with police at The court determined that the presenting of his arm 
to the phlebotomist, failing to again verbally or physically resist the draw, was insufficient. The 
actions of compliance on the part of Rios only showed he was following the officer's orders. 
Compliance is not consent. Rios, Supra. 
The District Court reasoned, "The State bears the burden to prove consent by a 
preponderance of the evidence." Bobeck v. Idaho Transportation Dept., 159 Idaho 539,544, 363 
P.3d 861, 866 (Ct. App. 2015) citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14 (1974); 
State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003); and State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 
747, 749, 947 P2d 420,422 (Ct. App. 1977)). 
Whether consent was granted voluntarily, or was a product of coercion, is 
a question of fact to be determined based upon all the surrounding 
circumstances. This includes accounting for subtle coercive police 
questions and the subjective state of the party granting consent to search. 
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The fact that a defendant is in custody when he or she grants consent to 
search is not, by itself, sufficient to prove the consent was involuntary. 
(emphasis added) 
Hansen, 138 Idaho at 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (internal citations omitted). R, p. 202. 
The court then held that Coats had given both implied and direct consent. Id at R, p. 
202, " ... based on the totality of the circumstances, that Coats never refused, protested, or 
objected to Kelly's obtaining a blood sample." Id. Even further, that "Police have a right to ask 
further questions after the right to remain silent is asserted, so long as those questions are not 
designed to elicit incriminating statements." Id (emphasis added) 
The District Court indicated that the standard for evaluating Miranda rights is different 
than the standard for evaluating waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. R, p.203. 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has stated that Miranda 
safeguards protect only against express questions, as well as words or 
actions, by the police that are likely to elicit an incriminating response. 
See Rhode Islandv. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90 
(1980). As the court stated: 
[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in 
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional 
equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda 
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or 
actions on the part of the police ( other than those normally 
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect. 
Citations omitted. R, pp. 203,204. 
The court found that the officer's request to take a blood test is not a violation of 
Miranda, Id. and that Coats had not revoked his implied consent. Id No coercion was applied 
by the officer. Id The court acknowledged that "subtle police tactics" can amount to coercion, 
however, but found that such tactics were not used here. Id. Further that the subject was not in a 
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vulnerable subjective state. Id. The court described the discussion with the officer as using 
conversational tone, not overbearing or threatening. Id. No false assertions were made by the 
officer. Id. Finally, besides not revoking implied consent, Coats gave his consent verbally then, 
at the hospital, in writing. Whether there was police misconduct should be considered. 
. . . . determining the flagrancy and purpose of the police misconduct 
"satisfies the deterrence rationale for application of the exclusionary rule." 
United States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989); Bainbridge, 
117 Idaho at 250, 787 P.2d at 236. This factor is "particularly important." 
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 23 (1990). "In the [Fourth Amendment] 
context, the 'single and distinct' purpose for the exclusionary rule is 
deterrence of police violations of that constitutional protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 
1037, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Tehan v. United States ex rel. 
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 413 (1966)). The "exclusionary rule serves to deter 
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some 
circumstances recurring or systematic negligence." Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009). Application of the exclusionary rule, 
however, "does not serve this deterrent function when the police action, 
although erroneous, was not undertaken in an effort to benefit the police at 
the expense of the suspect's protected rights." United States v. Fazio, 914 
F .2d 950, 958 (7th Cir. 1990). 
Flagrant and purposeful conduct occurs when the police 
misconduct is investigatory in design and is executed "in the hope that 
something might turn up." Brown, 422 U.S. at 605. Conversely, if an 
officer engages in misconduct while acting in good faith, the conduct is 
unlikely flagrant or purposeful. United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 
1060, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2004). Similarly, police mistakes that are the 
result of negligence are not flagrant or purposeful. Strieff, _ U.S. at_, 
136 S. Ct. at 2063. "[S]ystemic error or reckless disregard for 
constitutional requirements," however, constitutes flagrant or purposeful 
misconduct. Herring, 555 U.S. at 147. 
State v. Cohagan, Ct.App. Opinion No. 78 (December 5, 2016). 
It is clear that the conduct of Officer Kelly was flagrant and personal. The continued 
questioning was a flagrant violation of Miranda. The questioning was investigatory, designed 
for the purpose of obtaining "Soma", "four pills", using prescription drugs without a prescription. 
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From there it was a short walk to getting consent for the blood draw. The police were benefitted 
at the expense of Coats' rights. 
Regarding whether Coats was vulnerable or not, at the scene he was reported to be 
unstable on his feet (almost falling down), mumbled speech, couldn't write, and incoherent. At 
the station, after the blow, Coats was told by the officer that he was not functioning normally 
(zero balance), (can't stand up for more than 3 seconds without falling over), (difficulty putting 
socks on/almost falling over). He knew that Coats had consumed some type of drug. R, pp. 13, 
14. Officer Kelly testified at the preliminary hearing that Coats was having a very difficult time 
being able to understand the questions and then being able to formulate a response to those 
questions. R, p. 134. Officer Kelly further testified that he ceased the testing for safety reasons 
because Coats would stumble and nearly fall. R., p. 135. Shortly thereafter Coats invoked his 
Miranda rights. 
Notice that in the first question, the words "do you want to talk with me about what you 
have been doing today?" Answer "No." R, p. 121; CD/Audio-Defendant's Exhibit A, Officer 
Kelly/Messenger Audio, Track III at 51:20. Another, "you don't want to talk with me?" Id The 
officer is not only asking him if he wants to invoke his Miranda rights, but if he "wants to talk" 
with him. Coats says no, twice. The request of the officer was much broader than just Miranda. 
In fact, he is asked by Coats if it is bad to say no-he didn't want to talk. Upon "clarifying" the 
officer is told "no", a second time. 
At this juncture the officer knows two things. One is that Coats has "been consuming 
some kind of drug". That Coats is not functioning nonnally. Finally, that the DRE to obtain a 
warrant was not available. R, p. 122; CD/Audio-Defendant's Exhibit A, Officer Kelly/Messenger 
Audio, Track Ill at 40:00. He needed to get consent. Kelly was told to "get a blood draw". Id. 
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So, contrary to the District Court's findings, you do have someone who is on something; 
who is vulnerable, and the intent and purpose clearly is to get Coats' consent for a blood draw. 
In terms of revocation of implied consent, if an individual says I don't want to talk, the 
no means I don't want to talk to you. No more conversation. If consent is not given to talk, 
how can the same words be construed to leave further conversation and a blood draw on the 
table? When specifically asked about the blood draw, Coats said "Is that necessary?". R, p.122; 
CD/Audio-Defendant's Exhibit A, Officer Kelly/Messenger Audio, Track III at 52:00. Hardly an 
indication of consent. The officer then responds that he thinks Coats has taken something and it 
is affecting his ability to function. R, p. 122; CD/Audio-Defendant's Exhibit A, Officer 
Kelly/Messenger Audio, Track III at 53:00. Hardly the correct and honest answer, which was 
and is a simple no. Coats was misled. 
Although he has been told twice that the Coats didn't want to talk, the officer proceeded. 
In addition the officer continued the questioning to not have to obtain a search warrant per 
McNeely. He knew there would be drugs in the defendant's system and wanted the blood drawn 
and the results obtained. The only purpose of continued questioning was to obtain consent for a 
blood draw. 
The officer goes through another series of questions. R, p. 197. The officer indicates that 
he wants to know what it was, two ways to know, one being told, and just be honest. So all that 
violates Miranda, but he gets his answer, "Soma". So now the officer has his suspicion 
confirmed. Then he asks if he would be willing to draw blood so he could test it to determine 
how much Soma was in his system. Comparing the officers questioning, or techniques to 
Holman, the blood test should be suppressed. Yes, Miranda is different that the Fourth 
Amendment. However, the follow up interrogation following the "NO" answers, was in clear 
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violation of constitutional protections. The questions elicited incriminating responses, although 
suppressed, set the stage for cooperation and consent. Contrary to Schmember it is not as simple 
as to say the defendant was asked to take a blood test. The decision to comply was based upon a 
series of questions, not asking the defendant if they could draw blood, but rather, by filling the 
defendant with questions causing him to be persuaded to comply. Taken as a whole, the 
questions were misleading, manipulative, false, and/or provided a false purpose. 
The answer that the officer finally elicited, "Soma", provided the officer with the answer 
he wanted all along. Id., R. p. 197, CD/Audio-Defendant's Exhibit A, Officer Kelly/Messenger 
Audio, Track III at 53:13. But, same was in violation of Miranda and suppressed. Building upon 
this illicit statement, the officer is off and running and renews the request for a blood test. He 
asks again about a blood test, this time if he would be willing to allow the draw to occur at the 
hospital. The defendant's "yea" on the basis of how much Soma you have in your system was a 
ruse. When asking if a draw "would help me out" the idea that we would figure out what it is, is 
nonsensical. They already knew it was Soma. They already knew he took four pills. The 
officers, "its just the course of action that we want to do". Well, Coats really didn't want to do 
that. We, meaning law enforcement, want to do that and want the blood results to prosecute 
you. However, that is not the disclosures the officer made. All the time reminding Coats 
how bad off he was, severely under the influence. 
The consent obtained was based upon the violation of Miranda. The fruit of the 
poisonous tree, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US. 471 (1963), was the basis for the consent. 
Consistent with Wong Sun, and Harmon, this type of conduct should not, and cannot be allowed 
to support implied or actual consent. After the second "NO", every query to Coats was 
designed to elicit an incriminating response. It is on the back of those queries, and their elicit 
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admissions, that consent was obtained. "I just want to know what is going on." Is not truthful, is 
misleading, and a means of obfuscation. 
Coats understands that the Fifth Amendment and Fourth Amendment are on different 
tracks for review. However, the officer's question, twice, was "do you want to talk to me ...... " 
Which was answered, "NO" twice. The "NO" response should be applied to both "tracks", so to 
speak. Coats invoked his Miranda rights and he doesn't want any more conversation-he is 
done. So, NO means NO. 
As the questioning continues, incriminating statements _are made, in violation of Miranda 
which are suppressed. While suppressed for Miranda purposes, the ruling allows such 
questioning to provide a basis for obtaining consent. The District Court acknowledges Harmon, 
infra, but distinguishes the cases. R, p.206, footnote 6. The court is correct that Coats' position 
is "that Kelly did not merely explain the consequences of a blood draw, but engaged in a 
conversation-in violation of Miranda-calculated solely to gain Coats' consent to the blood 
draw." Exactly. Of course that was the purpose of continuing the conversation. There was no 
DRE examiner present. Contrary to the District Court's conclusion, Coats was vulnerable as set 
forth above. It was the mission of the officer to obtain consent for a blood draw. 
That consent was "accomplished by trickery or deceit amounting to police misconduct" 
applies here. Unlike Harmon, who was told that his license would be suspended for failure to · 
take the test, Coats' response was "is it necessary?" Which doesn't get answered except that the 
officer believes he has taken something that impairs his ability to function. Later in the 
questioning, the officer gets his answer which is "Soma", but the interrogation doesn't stop 
there. So, the officer starts out this portion by wanting to just find out what he is taken, what he 
is "on". He gets his answer. That wasn't enough, he moves on to testing again so he can get the 
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evidence he needs. Again, of course the purpose of the conversation was to get the consent for 
the blood draw. In this case, the officer was misleading. Id. It is clear that the first step was to 
get an admission of drug use, once you have that move to consent. The officer never intended to 
be satisfied with just knowing he has used "Soma". Indeed, he violated Miranda so he knew he 
couldn't use that, he had to have the test. The officer was clearly not acting only as an officer as 
the language and the tone was that he and the Defendant needed to know what was in his 
system. Of course, Coats already knew what was in his system, and later so did the officer-
mission accomplished. Coats was misled. The officer only got to consent by convincing Coats 
that he needed to know something they both already knew. The Harmon court also noted that if 
he "blew" over a .10 he would be guilty. So such information or belief was established here. In 
fact it is clear from the record that Coats just believed he was providing "information" as 
requested by the officer, not incriminating evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Coats respectfully requests that this Honorable Court vacate the decision of the District 
Court and the blood draw test results be suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /o day of April, 2017. 
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